Product Description: Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory framework which specifies the requirements for the success and failure of deterrence. In this book the success or failure of the deterrence theory in the Arab-Israeli wars.

CONTENTS Introduction "Designing Around" I: The "War of Attrition," Success or Failure? Balance of Interests Competing Hypotheses Egypt's and Israel's Interests During the War of Attrition Egypt's and Israel's Strategies and Secondary Interests Egypt's Perception of Israel's Strategic and Reputational Interests The Balance of Capability Competing Hypotheses Stein's Critique of Egypt's Strategy The Balance of Capability in the War of Attrition Israel's Use of Its Air Force The Relationship Between Strategy and Objectives in Egypt's Strategy The Role of Opportunity in Egypt's Decisions to Challenge Reputations Why did Egypt Challenge Despite Israel's Reputation for Brinkmanship? Did Egypt Miscalculate Israel's Capacity for Endurance? Recreating Reputation-for-Capability in the War of Attrition The Competition of General Reputations with Other Interests Crisis Bargaining Behavior Competing Hypotheses Why Were Costly Signals Uninformative? The Failure of Reassurance to Produce Deterrence Stability Conclusion: "Designing Around," Success or Failure? "Designing Around" II: The Yom Kippur War, Success or Failure? Egypt's Goals and Strategy Stein's Critique The Balance of Capability Crisis Bargaining Behavior Success or Failure Conclusion Notes About the Author