search for books and compare prices
Tables of Contents for History in Dispute
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
About the Series
xi
 
Acknowledgments
xii
 
Preface
xiii
 
Dennis Showalter
Chronology
xvii
 
African Americans: Was the position of African Americans in U.S. society improved by the war experience?
1
8
Yes. Wartime service enabled African Americans to receive greater political and economic opportunities
2
3
Vance R. Skarstedt
No. World War I exacerbated racism
5
4
Michael S. Neiberg
Aircraft: Did aircraft play a significant role in the Great War?
9
9
Yes. As the war progressed, aircraft assumed more importance in ground attacks, interdiction, and strategic bombardment
10
4
Michael Terry
No. Aircraft were used primarily for observation and reconnaissance
14
4
James Corum
Allied Economics: Was the economic contribution of the United States a decisive factor in World War I?
18
8
Yes. Beginning in 1917 the United States provided an essential flow of men, money, and munitions to Europe
19
3
Paul A. Thomsen
No. The United States functioned in a secondary role as a banker, a supplier of raw materials, and a manufacturer of products designed elsewhere
22
4
David J. Ulbrich
American Impact: Was American participation in the Great War decisive?
26
7
Yes. The material and moral impact of U.S. intervention and the subsequent rapid deployment of troops to Europe both sustained the Allies and disheartened the Germans in the crucial early months of 1918
27
3
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The German empire collapsed under the weight of the combined efforts of the British and French from 1914-1918, not because of the arrival of American troops
30
3
Phil Giltner
BEF Command Structure: Was the British Expeditionary Force command structure too rigid?
33
8
Yes. Throughout the war, the bureaucratic nature of the BEF command structure hindered the realization of plans and policies
34
2
Daniel Todman
No. The British command structure demonstrated a capacity to integrate human resources and materiel into a war winning system
36
5
Sanders Marble
Belgian Neutrality: Was the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 the reason for Great Britain's declaration of war on Germany?
41
7
Yes. The international treaty of 1839 had formally acknowledged that Belgian neutrality was an important element in European Stability and British strategic interests
42
3
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The British has already determined to declare war once Germany had mobilized its military forces
45
3
John Wheatley
British Strategy: did Britain commit an error in deploying the BEF to France in 1914?
48
6
Yes. The half dozen Division of the BEF were no more than a flank guard in northern France. Developed through Antwerp, or even directed against the German Baltic coastline, they could have had a much greater effect
49
2
William R. Forstchen
No. ``Developments in technology and the increased size of armed forces had long since rendered strategies of the indirect approach'' ineffective against major powers
51
3
John Wheatley
British War Economy: Was the British war economy characterized by systematic government control?
54
6
Yes. The British government took firm control of the economy and employed a structured plan to conduct the war
55
2
William Terdoslavich
No. From the beginning Britain relied on the private sphere whenever possible and improvised as the need arose
57
3
Robert McJimsey
Brusilov Offensive: Did the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 demonstrate the vigor of the Russian army?
60
7
Yes. The Russians employed innovative tactical methods to cope with trench warfare
61
3
Graydon A. Tunstall
No. The initial Russian success reflected the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian opposition; the offensive eventually stalled as much from the incompetence of the Russian High Command as from enemy resistance
64
3
David L. Ruffley
Cavalry: Was cavalry in World War I an antiquated combat arm?
67
7
Yes. Although cavalry had mobility, it was rendered obsolete by the increased firepower of the Great War
68
2
Nikolas Gardner
No. When used properly, cavalry provided tactical and Operational mobility that could influence the course of a battle
70
4
Daniel Todman
Convoys: Was Great Britain's failure to introduce a convoy system prior to 1917 a mistake?
74
6
Yes. The loss rates for unescorted merchant ships are proof that the Royal Navy neglected protection of merchant vessels in favor of fleet action against U boats and raiders
75
2
David J. Ulbrich
No. German U boats, limited in number and capabilities, were Never a serious threat to British merchant shipping
77
3
Dennis Showalter
Cultural Watershed: Was World War I a cultural turning point?
80
11
Yes. World War I caused a drastic change in traditional social norms and values
81
5
Paul Du Quenoy
Yes. The experience of World War I represented a loss of innocence for Europe
86
2
Susan A. Ashley
No. The great transformation in twentieth century culture and society came from modernism, a movement intensified and extended by World War I but introduced well before 1914
88
3
Dennis Showalter
William J. Astore
End of Imperialism: Did the Great war mark the end of imperialism?
91
7
Yes. After four years of warfare, imperial powers lacked the means and the will to sustain their empires against a rising tide of nationalism
92
1
Phil Giltner
No. After the war, imperial powers expanded their control in the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America
93
5
William Kautt
European Leadership: Was World Was I caused by inadequate political and military leadership in Europe?
98
6
Yes. Before the July Crisis of 1914, no European leader was able to confront the looming catastrophe
99
2
R. L. Dinardo
No. The men who made European policy decisions in 1914 are best understood as prisoner of events
101
3
Paul A. Thomsen
Foch: Was the appointment of Ferdinand Foch as supreme commander a turning point in the Allied war effort on the Western Front?
104
7
Yes. Foch skillfully thwarted the German offensive of 1918
105
2
Michael S. Neiberg
No. Foch was a figurehead, who never directly coordinated Allied offensive operations
107
4
Robert B. Bruce
French African Troops: Did the French use of African troops on the Western Front constitute imperialist exploitation?
111
8
Yes. The French army considered African troops as essentially cannon fodder, whose performance did nothing to modify the traditional imperial systems of rule and control
112
3
Deborah A. Schmitt
No. The French African soldiers were regarded as elite shock troops, and they played an increasingly important role in the war effort as regular manpower reserves declined
115
4
obert B. Bruce
German Collapse: Was the surrender of Germany in 1918 a consequence of a decisive military defeat?
119
7
Yes. The German Army lost the war on the battlefield
120
2
Albert Palazzo
No. Germany surrendered because military leaders recognized that German society could not endure wartime conditions any longer
122
4
Robert T. Foley
German Tactics: Did the German General Staff effectively implement tactical and doctrinal innovations during the war?
126
7
Yes. The German General Staff had a highly effective organization that ensured new tactics were rapidly incorporated into military training programs
127
2
James Corum
No. Most of the new tactics adopted by the German Army were improvisations made by lower level staff and field officers
129
4
Dennis Showalter
Habsburgs: Did Austria Hungary fall victim to conflicting nationalisms?
133
6
Yes. Ethnic groups throughout the empire sought their own salvation outside the crumbling imperial framework
134
2
John Wheatley
No. The nationalities of the Austro Hungarian Empire held together remarkably well throughout the war, and they sought independence only after they had discovered that the Allies had no interest in sustaining the Habsburg system
136
3
Alon Rachamimov
High Seas Fleet: Was the strategic concept of the German High Seas Fleet sound?
139
7
Yes. The High Seas Fleet represented a reasonable risk response to the geographic and political situation of Germany, and it performed well in the first two years of the war
140
2
William Terdoslavich
No. The German battle fleet produced a small return for the investment of manpower, money, and resources
142
4
sanders Marble
Homosexuality: Did the war experience foster awareness and acceptance of homosexuality and homoeroticism?
146
8
Yes. World War I provided a context for men to express erotic conceptions of virile masculinity and misogyny
147
3
Bobby A. Wintermute
No. War was the province of conventionally defined masculinity that made little room for unconventional sexuality
150
4
David J. Ulbrich
Imperial Russia: Was Imperial Russia's gradual dissolution in 1914-1915 a manifestation of structural weaknesses exacerbated by the war?
154
8
Yes. The tsarist policy of centralizing power, limiting reforms, and ignoring the suggestions of advisers ensured that Russia could not effectively wage war and remedy its internal problems
155
1
Greta Bucher
No. The crisis in Russia was a function of military defeats that reflected the incompetence of the high military command
156
6
Paul Du Quenoy
Japan: Was Japan's role during World War I essentially imperialistic?
162
8
Yes. Japan took advantage of the Western powers' withdrawal from Asia to seek its own empire on the mainland and in the western Pacific
163
4
Jack Hayes
No. The Japanese goal was not hegemony but ``intimate cooperation'' with China and Manchuria
167
3
Dennis Showalter
Kevin Clark
League of Nations: Did the League of Nations live up to its mandate to insure peace through collective security?
170
6
Yes. The League provided an effective problem solving forum in the immediate postwar years
171
1
Phil Giltner
No. The structure and mandates of the League gave it authority without power and made it ultimately dependent on the goodwill of the great powers
172
4
Daniel Butcher
Maritime Technology: Did unreliable technology handicap navies during World War I?
176
7
Yes. Naval vessels suffered from poor designs and communications
177
2
Vincent J. Scutaro
No. Naval operations during the Great War were hindered by the failure of the admirals to develop strategic and operational doctrines that utilized the capabilities of their warships
179
4
Sanders Marble
Q-ships: Did the British use of armed merchant vessels inadvertently stimulate the German development of unrestricted submarine warfare?
183
6
Yes. The possible presence of Q-ships (armed merchant vessels) made U-boats less willing to surface and warn merchant crews before sinking their vessels
184
2
John Abbatiello
No. The logic of submarine attacks worked against traditional rules of naval warfare, and the presence or absence of Q-ships had no bearing on the situation
186
3
Vincent J. Scutaro
Russian Logistics: Did Russian have an efficient logistical system during the Great War?
189
7
Yes. Although Russia did suffer some shortage during the Conflict, it produced and received enough materiel to sustain its war effort
190
2
David L. Ruffley
No. The Russian logistical system was able to only sustain the material demands of the war for a few months before sliding into gridlock and eventual collapse
192
4
Paul Du Quenoy
Russian Revolution: Was the return of Vladimir Lenin and several other exiled Bolshevik leaders in 1917 decisive to the development of the Russian Revolution?
196
7
Yes. Without Lenin the Bolsheviks had no reasonable chance of imposing their particular structure on the revolutionary process
197
4
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The Russian Revolution was well on its course before Lenin's return
201
2
Greta Bucher
Salonika: Was there a strategic value to the Allied occupation of Salonika in Greece?
203
6
Yes. The Salonika expedition helped to erode the enemy position in the Balkans to the point that by the fall of 1918 the Allies were able to achieve a decisive breakthrough
203
3
Edward J. Erickson
No. The deployment of Allied troops in the area occurred too late to help save Serbia
206
3
Dennis Showalter
Shell Shock: Was the high incidence of shell shock during the Great War attributable to a failure of leadership
209
8
Yes. The failure of officers to instill esprit de corps, to maintain a paternalistic attitude, and to recognize the limits of their troops' endurance escalated the incidence of psychological breakdowns
210
2
H. B. McCartney
No. The physical effects of the extraordinary volume of lethal firepower that was a normal condition of the frontline experience caused behavioral disturbances in many soldiers
212
5
Mark A. R. Facknitz
Strategic Bombing: Did the strategic bombing of cities by the British and Germans lead to total war?
217
7
Yes. Both sides hoped that bombings would depress civilian morale and drive the enemy to the negotiating table
218
2
James Corum
No. Technological, doctrinal, and organizational limitations relegated strategic bombing to a nuisance weapon throughout the war
220
4
John D. Plating
Structural Flaws: Was World War I the result of structural flaws in the European political system that developed after 1871?
224
6
Yes. Increasing nationalism and militarism in the last half of the nineteenth century made the war inevitable
225
1
Phil Giltner
No. The Great War was triggered by specific events; beginning with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and fueled by a series of short sighted decisions by national leaders
226
4
William J. Astore
Trench Warfare: Did trench warfare lead to pointless slaughter?
230
7
Yes. The trench experience reduced soldiers to level of passivity
231
2
Mary Habeck
No. Trench warfare actually held men out of the line in support or reserve most of the time, and its defining experiences, barrages an attacks, were unusual
233
4
H. B. McCartney
Tsar Nicholas II: Did the decision of Tsar Nicholas II to take personal command at the front accelerate that fall of the Russian Empire?
237
8
Yes. The tsar was unqualified to command at the front, and the exacerbated an already bad situation by a series of poor decisions
238
2
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The Russian military situation was so bad by late 1915 that decisions made by the tsar after that point had little bearing on the collapse of the empire
240
5
David L. Ruffley
U.S. Entry: Was the United States motivated to enter the war by self interest?
245
7
Yes. The Wilson administration realized that U.S. geopolitical interests were not best served by German hegemony in Europe
246
4
Paul Du Quenoy
No. Woodrow Wilson believed that American entry into the ( Great War was a moral commitment to restructuring the world order so that a conflict of this nature could never happen again
250
2
Phil Giltner
Verdun: Did the Germans hope to achieve a military or a political goal at the Battle of Verdun?
252
7
The Battle of Verdun marked an attempt by General Erich von Falkenhayn to defeat the French army by means of attrition
253
3
Robert T. Foley
The German goal at Verdun was to force France out of the war by convincing the government that victory was impossible
256
3
Dennis Showalter
Ypres: Did the Germans needlessly sacrifice students and underage volunteers at the Battle of Ypres?
259
7
Yes. The German army and government were shortsighted in committing so many potential officers to battle as ordinary infantrymen in newly raised units
260
2
Dennis Showalter
No. German planning was based on a war of short duration, arid victory seemed close enough in 1914 to justify using every available resource in a massive offensive
262
4
Robert T. Foley
Yugoslavia: Was the new state of Yugoslavia simply ``Greater Serbia''?
266
7
Yes. Serb leader Nicola Pasic intended to create a centralized state dominated by Serbia
267
1
David N. Spires
No. The South Slavic federation proclaimed at the end of the war began with a mutual determination to establish ethnic cooperation
268
5
Lawrence A. Helm
Julijana Budjevac
Appendix:
273
42
References
315
6
Contributors' Notes
321
2
Index
323