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Tables of Contents for The Irony of Vietnam
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
Introduction
1
8
PART ONE Decisions: Getting into Vietnam
Patterns, Dilemmas, and Explanations
9
18
Patterns
9
2
Dilemmas
11
3
A Range of Explanations
14
9
Stereotypes Fail
23
1
Summary: Three Propositions
24
3
Recurrent Patterns and Dilemmas from Roosevelt to Eisenhower
27
42
``Hot Potato'' Briefings
27
3
The ``Asian Berlin''
30
2
The Roosevelt Administration
32
4
The Truman Administration
36
14
The Eisenhower Administration
50
19
Picking up the Torch: The Kennedy Administration
69
27
Fastening the Commitment: 1961
72
7
Buildup and Breakdown
79
7
Taking the Reins: 1963
86
10
Intervention in Force: The Johnson Administration, I
96
48
Preparing for Pressure: 1964
97
19
Crossing the Rubicon: Early 1965
116
14
Setting the Pattern of Perseverance: Late 1965
130
14
Coming Home to Roost: The Johnson Administration, II
144
37
On the Tiger's Back: 1966-67
145
11
Debate, Diplomacy, and Disillusionment
156
14
Off the Tiger's Back: The Reckoning of 1968
170
11
PART TWO Goals: The Imperative Not to Lose
National Security Goals and Stakes
181
20
The Cautious Route to Commitment
182
8
Exploring the Security Issue
190
7
The Domino Theory
197
4
Domestic Political Stakes
201
26
The Two Phases of American Policy on Vietnam
203
17
Practical Political Considerations
220
7
The Bureaucracy and the Inner Circle
227
22
Career Services and U.S. Stakes in Vietnam
227
9
Pressure from the Top and from the Bottom
236
4
Concluding Observations about the Imperative Not to Lose
240
9
PART THREE Means: The Minimum Necessary and the Maximum Feasible
Constraints
249
23
Four Strategies for Winning
252
6
The Fate of the ``Winning'' Strategies
258
9
Building and Breaching ``Firebreaks''
267
5
Pressures and the President
272
27
Pressures to Do Both More and Less
273
5
Presidential Responses
278
8
Presidential Management of the Political System
286
5
How the System Helped the President
291
3
Strategy and Politics: The Presidents' Dilemmas
294
5
PART FOUR Perceptions: Realism, Hope, and Compromise
Optimism, Pessimism, and Credibility
299
24
Contradictions and Hedging
300
2
The Roots of Internal Estimates
302
8
The Cycle of Highs and Lows
310
8
Estimates and Escalation
318
5
The Strategy of Perseverance
323
24
The Stalemated War
324
7
Elements of the Strategy
331
16
PART FIVE Conclusions
The Lessons of Vietnam
347
24
Nixon's and Ford's Policies
348
4
How the System Worked
352
2
Two Schools of Thought on the Lessons of Vietnam
354
9
Recommendations
363
8
Documentary Appendix
371
4
Bibliographical Note
375
2
Index
377