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Tables of Contents for Mental Symbols
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
Introduction A Fly in a Bottle
xi
Chapter 1 Conservative Rationalism I
1
24
1.1 Common-sense Psychology
1
7
1.1.1 The language of thought
2
1
1.1.2 The computer analogy
3
2
1.1.3 The referential theory of meaning
5
3
1.2 The Supervenience Chain
8
8
1.2.1 Syntactically identical symbol-tokens with different extensions
9
3
1.2.1.1 Narrow and broad meaning
10
2
1.2.2 Complex symbols under-determining extensions
12
2
1.2.3 Syntactically distinct complex symbols with identical extensions
14
2
1.3 The Nomic Theory of Reference
16
5
1.3.1 The four-phase nomic theory of reference
17
3
1.3.1.1 The physical phase
18
1
1.3.1.2 The psychophysical phase
19
1
1.3.1.3 The psychological phase
19
1
1.3.1.4 The sociological phase
19
1
1.3.2 An error in an account of error?
20
1
1.4 Casus Belli
21
1
1.5 Nomenclature
22
3
Chapter 2 The Idea as World and Will A Belief in a Contribution of Environment to Meaning and a Division of Semantic Labour
25
14
2.1 The Ambiguous Meaning of "Meaning"
25
7
2.1.1 Scientists as semantic experts
25
1
2.1.2 A Middlebrow compromise between extensionalism and mentalism
26
3
2.1.3 Pragmatic realism
29
3
2.2 The Will to Linguistic Power
32
7
2.2.1 Semantic oligarchy: scientists as unrepresentative leaders
32
3
2.2.2 A Westminster system? Extensions as Lords, stereotypes as Commons
35
1
2.2.3 KoXXXX03 semantics, or meaning holism
35
1
2.2.4 Semantic tyranny: Merlin knows and rules by meaning alone
36
3
Chapter 3 Sentence-based Semantics Early Steps toward Semantic Holism
39
20
3.1 Motivation for Semantic Holism
39
2
3.2 Frege on Term-based Semantics
41
6
3.2.1 Imagistic mentalism: variability in vorstellungen
43
2
3.2.2 Number-referring terms in axiomatic proofs
45
2
3.3 Russell on Term-based Semantics
47
5
3.3.1 Meaningful terms referring to non-existent objects
50
1
3.3.2 The sentence-based semantics of denoting phrases
50
2
3.4 Carnap's Semantic Verificationism
52
7
3.4.1 Sentences as fundamental bearers of meaning
55
1
3.4.2 Meaning as method of verification
55
1
3.4.3 Contingent verification as confirmation of indefinitely many predictions
56
3
Chapter 4 Radical Empiricism I
59
18
4.1 Meaning and Non-existent Entities
59
1
4.2 The Separation of Meaning and Reference
60
9
4.2.1 The nominalistic extensional theory of meaning
64
1
4.2.2 The realistic extensional theory of meaning
65
4
4.2.2.1 The conceptual-scheme relativity of what there is
65
2
4.2.2.2 The explanatory power and simplicity of a conceptual scheme
67
1
4.2.2.3 The actual use of language, and actual practices of positing universals
68
1
4.3 Mental and Mind-Independent Semantic Universals
69
8
4.3.1 The bad metaphysics charge
70
2
4.3.2 The virtus dormitiva charge
72
1
4.3.3 The undefinability charge
73
4
Chapter 5 Radical Empiricism II
77
30
5.1 Two Major Routes to Semantic Holism
77
1
5.2 The Route from Verificationism to Holism
77
10
5.2.1 Synthetic statements
79
6
5.2.1.1 Phenomenalism in natural science
80
1
5.2.1.2 Universal epistemic revisability
80
3
5.2.1.3 The inference from confirmation holism to semantic holism
83
2
5.2.2 Analytic statements
85
2
5.3 The Route from Behaviourism to Holism
87
13
5.3.1 The argument from collateral information
90
2
5.3.2 The argument from inscrutability of reference
92
1
5.3.3 Four refutations of behavioural holism
93
7
5.3.3.1 The language-learning argument
94
1
5.3.3.2 The premiss that meaning is what a sentence shares with its translation
95
1
5.3.3.3 The argument from collateral information
96
1
5.3.3.4 The argument from inscrutability of reference
97
3
5.4 Remarks on Middlebrow Pragmatism
100
7
5.4.1 Meaning holism
100
1
5.4.2 The coherence theory of truth
101
2
5.4.3 The satisfaction theory of reference
103
2
5.4.4 Holism's wake
105
2
Chapter 6 Conservative Rationalism II
107
18
6.1 The Old Sorcerer's Supervenience Chain
107
3
6.2 Misrepresentation and Asymmetric Dependence
110
6
6.3 The Sociological Phase of Reference
116
9
Chapter 7 The Classical Theory of Mind I
125
42
7.1 Five Ways of Defining Logical Modality
125
2
7.2 The Classical Theory of Mind
127
5
7.2.1 There is a finite basis of semantically simple ideas (taken as types of symbol), or simple terms of the mind's representational code
127
1
7.2.2 There is a generative mechanism comprising operations for the production of infinitely many complex ideas from the empirical basis
128
1
7.2.3 There is a generative mechanism comprising operations for the production of infinitely many propositions from the stock of simple and complex ideas
129
1
7.2.4 There are finitely many basic psychological operations on propositions
130
1
7.2.5 There is a generative mechanism for the production of complex psychological operations on propositions
131
1
7.3 The Classical Theory of Representation
132
5
7.3.1 Basic ideas
133
1
7.3.2 Complex ideas, and the a priori ideas generating them
133
2
7.3.2.1 The simple a priori ideas XXX and XXX
133
1
7.3.2.2 The complex a priori ideas XXX, XXX, etc.
134
1
7.3.2.3 The simple a priori predicate =
134
1
7.3.2.4 Complex empirical ideas
134
1
7.3.3 Propositions, and the a priori ideas generating them
135
2
7.3.3.1 The simple a priori idea X
135
1
7.3.3.2 The complex a priori idea A
136
1
7.3.3.3 Propositions
136
1
7.3.3.3.1 Identify propositions
136
1
7.3.3.3.2 Quantified propositions
136
1
7.3.3.3.3 Compound propositions
136
7.4 Aspects of the Classical Theory of Knowledge
137
6
7.4.1 Locke on epistemic evaluation
137
1
7.4.2 Locke's prevision of a new `Logick and Critick'
138
3
7.4.3 Metalogical principles and definitions
141
2
7.5 Modal Properties in the Model Code
143
9
7.5.1 Analytic evaluation in the model of CTM
143
6
7.5.2 The trifling propositions a=a and (Ax) (Fx XXX Fx)
149
2
7.5.3 Comments on innate and a priori knowledge
151
1
7.6 The Complex Ideas of Implication
152
8
7.6.1 Assuming and implying in a true conditional
152
3
7.6.1.1 Assuming a logical falsehood
152
1
7.6.1.2 Implying a logical falsehood
153
1
7.6.1.3 Assuming a logical truth
153
1
7.6.1.4 Implying a logical truth
154
1
7.6.2 The complex ideas XXX, XXX, XXX, and XXX
155
5
7.6.2.1 The complex a priori ideas of necessary implication
155
3
7.6.2.2 The complex a posteriori ideas of contingent implication
158
2
7.6.3 Comments concerning the normativity of complex ideas
160
1
7.7 The Complex A Priori Idea of Valid Deductive Inference
160
3
7.7.1 The complex a priori idea XXX
161
1
7.7.2 Some of Quine's objections against logical modality
162
1
7.8 Remarks on CTM and Analytic Philosophy
163
5
Chapter 8 The Classical Theory of Mind II
167
28
8.1 The Ontology and Architecture of CTM
167
3
8.2 Learning, Memory, and Association in Aplysia
170
5
8.3 Learning, Memory, and Association in Vertebrates
175
4
8.4 The Genetic Code, the Mental Code
179
10
8.4.1 The Classical Theory of Mind
180
1
8.4.2 A conjecture on the nature of mental symbols
181
1
8.4.3 Cognitive architecture
181
6
8.4.3.1 The vertical dimension
183
2
8.4.3.2 The horizontal dimension
185
2
8.4.4 Concept-acquisition and memory
187
1
8.4.5 Recall and simple associations
187
1
8.4.6 Rational processes
188
1
8.5 History, Histology, and the Molecular Level of Analysis
189
6
Chapter 9 The Classical Theory of Mind III
195
30
9.1 Toward an Integrated Account of Mind
195
1
9.2 The Symbolic System of a Deep-layer, Long-term-store Psychic Cell
195
18
9.2.1 Syntax
196
3
9.2.2 Semantics
199
2
9.2.3 Epistemology: cognitive processes in the psychic cell
201
12
9.2.3.1 A priori knowledge
202
8
9.2.3.1.1 Analysis
202
2
9.2.3.1.1.1 Implication
203
1
9.2.3.1.1.2 Inference
204
1
9.2.3.1.2 Synthesis
204
6
9.2.3.2 A posteriori knowledge
210
3
9.2.3.2.1 Observational, a posteriori ex terminis synthesis
211
1
9.2.3.2.2 Holistic a posteriori synthesis
212
1
9.3 The Mind as a System of Psychic Cells
213
4
9.3.1 The acquisition and retention of ideas
214
1
9.3.2 The recollection and remembrance of ideas
215
1
9.3.3 Associative processes
216
1
9.3.4 Rational processes
216
1
9.4 The Mind and its External Affairs
217
8
9.4.1 Adaptation in the natural and social environment
217
1
9.4.2 Mind and language
218
2
9.4.2.1 Words standing for simple ideas
218
1
9.4.2.2 Words standing for complex ideas
219
1
9.4.2.3 Statements standing for propositions
220
1
9.4.3 Levels of intellection and education
220
5
Chapter 10 The Tale of Russell's Paradox
225
18
10.1 The Misty Origins of Analytic Philosophy
225
5
10.2 Russell's Sophism in the Classical Theory of Mind
230
11
10.2.1 Levels of being
232
4
10.2.1.1 Metaphysical reality
232
1
10.2.1.2 Physical reality
233
1
10.2.1.3 Psychological reality
234
1
10.2.1.4 Social reality
235
1
10.2.2 Preliminaries: the smallest and the greatest set
236
5
10.2.3 The truth-condition of the sophism
238
3
10.3 The Well-Formedness of the Mind
241
2
Epilogue
243
5
Bibliography
247
12
Index
259