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Tables of Contents for The Institutional Transition of China's Township and Village Enterprises
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
List of Figures
viii
List of Tables
ix
Preface
xi
Series Editor's Preface
xvii
Introduction
1
20
TVE Sector and Its Role in China's Economic Growth
2
5
TVEs' Organization and the Focus of the Research
7
7
The Sources and the Methodology
14
4
The Organization of the Book
18
3
Local Government Leaders, Firm Managers, and the Two-tier Property Rights Structure of Collective TVEs
21
61
The Dual Role of Local Leaders in Rural Organization
24
4
The Objectives and Incentives of Local Leaders
28
14
The Objectives
28
4
The Incentives
32
10
The Property Rights Structure of Collective TVEs
42
12
Property Rights Theory
43
3
The Property Rights Structure in Socialist Public Enterprises
46
2
The Property Rights of Collective TVEs
48
6
The Advantage of Local Leaders as de facto Owner of Collective TVEs
54
21
Securing Property Rights
54
3
Access to Resources
57
13
Uncertainty and Risk Absorption
70
5
TVE Managers as the Agents of Local Community Government
75
7
The Re-delegation of the Control Rights from Community Government to firm Managers
76
1
The Constitution of TVE Managers
77
3
The Governance of Collective TVEs
80
2
The Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs
82
38
The Contractual Forms Implemented in Collective TVEs
83
19
The Work-point System
84
1
The Wage/Salary System
85
3
The Collective Contractual Responsibility System
88
3
The Personal Contractual Responsibility System
91
6
Leasing System
97
2
Auction
99
3
The Share-cooperative System
102
5
Three Categories of the Managerial Contractual Forms
107
6
The Coexistence, Evolution, and Cross-regional Variation in the Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs
113
7
Modeling the Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs
120
51
Institutions and Induced Institutional Innovation: A Brief Review of Institutional Economics
120
18
Institutions and Institutional Economics
121
3
Institutions of Governance
124
3
Contracting with Positive Transaction Costs
127
2
Governance Structure and Transaction Costs
129
3
Induced Institutional Innovation
132
6
What Factors May Determine the Contractual Form of TVEs?
138
13
The Model
151
5
Model Simulations and Implications
156
15
The Space Partition of Dominant Contractual Form
159
4
The Divergence in Firm's Technical Structure
163
2
Changes in the Relative Importance of External Management
165
3
Changes in Opportunity Incomes
168
3
Explaining the Contractual Form Innovation in Collective TVEs
171
37
Empirical Tests of the Model: The Explanatory Power of Model Predicted Factors
171
16
The Development of Markets
172
4
The Technical Structure of the Firm
176
8
The Economic Setting of the Locality
184
3
Empirical Tests of the Model: The Relative Importance of Model Predicted Factors
187
21
The Model and the Variables
187
6
The Data
193
3
The Results and the Explanations
196
9
Conclusions
205
3
Endogenous Reform and Induced Privatization: Concluding Remarks
208
38
Introduction
208
4
The Endogenous Model of Economic Reform: `Induced Privatization'
212
7
The Feedback Effects of Contractual Form Innovation
219
13
What Can We Learn?
232
7
Appendix
239
7
Diffusion of Fixed-payment Contractual Form
239
3
Stagnation in the Zhejiang Investigation Site
242
1
Trend of Privatization
242
1
Persistence of the Fixed-wage Managerial Form
243
1
Conclusions
244
2
Bibliography
246
20
Index
266