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Tables of Contents for The Economics of Information
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
List of Figures
vii
1
List of Tables
viii
1
Preface
ix
1 Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action
1
18
PART 1 ADVERSE SELECTION: THE MARKET FOR LEMONS
19
44
2 Quality Uncertainty and the `Market for Lemons'
19
13
3 Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model
32
14
4 Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence
46
12
References for Part I
58
5
PART 2 SIGNALLING
63
54
5 Job Market Signalling
63
18
6 Screening: A Self-selection Mechanism
81
11
7 Further Literature on Signalling Theory
92
10
8 Signalling Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence
102
10
References for Part 2
112
5
PART 3 MORAL HAZARD
117
70
9 Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations
117
18
10 Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model
135
13
11 Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory
148
19
12 Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence
167
15
References for Part 3
182
5
PART 4 MECHANISM DESIGN: APPLICATIONS TO BARGAINING AND AUCTIONS
187
58
13 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example
187
19
14 Auction Design: Theory
206
22
15 Auction Design: Experimental Evidence
228
14
References for Part 4
242
2
16 Concluding Comments
244
1
Appendix Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Bayes' Rule, Expected Utility and Game Theory
245
11
Index
256