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Tables of Contents for Competition Policy
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
List of figures
xii
List of tables
xiv
Preface
xv
Preliminaries
1
22
Competition law in the EC
1
3
Related topics
4
1
Some basic game-theoretic concepts
4
4
EC competition policy: `normal' or `active' competition
8
8
The logic of the book
16
7
I Explicit collusion
Four are few and six are many
23
16
The model
24
2
Stage 3: the supply decision subgame
26
4
Stage 2: the cartel bargaining subgame
30
3
Stage 1: the participation decision subgame
33
6
Cartel laws are good for business
39
8
The model
39
3
Stage 3: the (non-collusive) supply subgame
42
1
Stage 2: the cartel bargaining subgame
43
1
Stage 1: the entry subgames
43
4
Cartel enforcement
47
34
Cartel enforcement with imperfect information
49
7
Cartel enforcement with incomplete information
56
10
Cartels in public procurement markets
66
15
II Tacit collusion
Information sharing among oligopolists
81
13
Cournot--Nash equilibrium with uncertain demand and homogeneous goods
83
2
Acquisition and transmission of information
85
2
Differentiated goods
87
1
Uncertainty about costs
88
1
Facilitating practices
89
5
Repeated games with collusive outcomes
94
12
Friedman's balanced temptation equilibrium
94
5
The `Folk Theorem'
99
2
The great salt duopoly
101
5
Price leadership and conscious parallelism
106
18
Static games without uncertainty
107
4
Static games with uncertainty
111
4
A repeated game
115
2
Price parallelism and collusive practices
117
2
The basing point system in the ECSC
119
5
Collusion detection
124
27
Information requirements of collusion detection
124
2
A simple Cournot model with seasonal adjustments
126
5
The wood pulp case
131
5
The ICI--Solvay case
136
15
III Semicollusion
Excess capacity and collusion
151
22
The concept of semicollusion
151
1
Excess capacity and cartels in an historical perspective
152
2
A non-cooperative price-setting game with given capacities
154
5
Cartel negotiation with given capacities
159
2
Non-cooperative capacity choices with explicit collusion
161
3
Collusion detection
164
4
Non-cooperative capacity choices with tacit collusion
168
5
Collusion in R&D
173
12
The basic model
174
1
The results
175
5
Overinvestment in R&D and collusion
180
5
IV Predatory pricing
Predation in theory
185
21
Why predatory pricing is rare and unimportant
186
3
The chain store paradox or the impossibility of predation
189
3
The lack of common knowledge can generate predation
192
2
Reputation and predation
194
4
Nash equilibria and predation
198
4
Geographical price discrimination and predation
202
2
Necessary conditions for predatory pricing
204
2
Evidence on predation
206
24
Experimental evidence
206
9
Antitrust litigation
215
1
The historical record
216
5
The bus war: a modelling approach
221
9
Antitrust implications
230
26
Rules
230
10
Informational requirements
240
7
The AKZO decision
247
9
References
256
12
Index
268