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Tables of Contents for Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
List of Tables
x
1
List of Figures
xi
1
List of Appendix Tables
xii
1
Acknowledgements
xiii
2
List of Abbreviations
xv
Introduction
1
4
1 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Macroeconomic Management
5
30
Introduction
5
1
Revenue-sharing between the central and local governments
6
4
Division of expenditure responsibilities between the central and local governments
10
1
Basic propositions for assessing china's fiscal management system
11
2
The lack of fiscal policy instruments of the central government
13
6
Impaired performance of the central government's fiscal policy
19
5
The 1994 reform: tax-assignment system
24
2
Implications of the 1994 fiscal reform and remaining problems to be addressed
26
5
Conclusions
31
1
Appendix 1.1: macroeconomic Management and local autonomy in Japan
32
3
2 Central Government Credibility and Local Tax Efforts: a Game Theoretic Model
35
34
Introduction
35
3
Cooperative regions: the bench-mark case
38
5
Non-cooperative regions: commitment versus no commitment
43
5
Why does the center not want to commit: a time-inconsistency explanation
48
5
Addressing the time-inconsistency problem
53
11
The effect of the 1990 proposal -- increasing the center's share of total revenue
64
3
Concluding remarks
67
2
3 Central Government Transfer Under a Soft Budget Constraint
69
26
Introduction
69
2
Regions' lobbying under a hard budget constraint
71
3
Regions' lobbying under a soft budget constraint
74
3
Are regions better off with a soft budget constraint?
77
1
Why do the regions choose to lobby ex post?
78
2
The Cournot game between regions and lobbying effectiveness
80
4
The budget constraint problem under the center's commitment
84
5
Concluding remarks
89
1
Appendix 3.1: solving for optimal commitment tax rates for given expenditure target
90
2
Appendix 3.2: a comparison with Tullock (1980) and Becker (1983)
92
3
4 Intergovernmental Relations and Monetary Management
95
17
Introduction
95
1
Financial sector development before 1994
96
2
The central bank's instruments of monetary control
98
2
Money supply and macroeconomic stability
100
2
Why cannot the central bank control money supply at the desired level?
102
3
Reform cycles and monetary cycles
105
2
Monetary reform in 1994
107
2
Assessment of the 1994 monetary reform
109
1
Conclusions
110
2
5 Central Government Credibility and Monetary Expansion: a Game Theoretic Model
112
20
Introduction
112
1
Literature on China's inflation
112
3
Description of the credit allocation system
115
4
The commitment regime
119
1
The no commitment regime
120
3
Comparison of equilibria under the commitment and no commitment regimes
123
2
Conclusions
125
2
Appendix 5.1: deriving the equilibrium credit level under the no commitment regime
127
3
Appendix 5.2: solving for optimal additional credit (a) under the no commitment regime
130
1
Appendix 5.3: proof of Lnc >Lc
130
2
6 Intergovernmental Relations and Market Development
132
22
Introduction
132
1
Division of regulatory powers between the central and local governments
133
4
Impact of decentralization on the market system
137
10
Defining the limits of local government power: the relevance of international experience
147
6
Conclusions
153
1
Appendix Tables
154
11
End Notes
165
11
Bibliography
176
8
Index
184