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Tables of Contents for Learning from Conflict
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
Illustrations
vii
2
Preface and Reader's Guide
ix
2
Acknowledgments
xi
2
Abbreviations
xiii
Introduction and Theoretical Overview
1
18
Part I OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
19
48
1 The Sources of Doctrinal Change: Structuring Contending Theoretical Explanations
19
28
2 Development and Evolution of U.S. Doctrine for Counterinsurgency and LIC
47
20
Part II CASE STUDY 1 Analyzing Change to Published U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam War Era
67
62
3 Official Army Studies on Counterinsurgency and LIC: Identifying Shortcomings
67
20
4 Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam War Era: Has There Been Conceptual Change?
87
22
5 Did the Army Learn?: Assessing the Doctrinal Evidence
109
20
Part III CASE STUDY 2 Testing for Doctrinal Continuity: The U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance Effort in El Salvador
129
62
6 "Drawing the Line" in Central America: U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance in El Salvador
129
20
7 Counterinsurgency from Vietnam to El Salvador: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity
149
14
8 Why Didn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine Change after the Vietnam War?: Testing Hypotheses
163
28
Part IV CASE STUDY 3 Testing for Doctrinal Change or Continuity: The Drug War in the Andean Ridge
191
38
9 Fighting the Drug War in the Andean Ridge
191
18
10 Explaining Doctrinal Change: The Drug War in the Andean Ridge
209
20
Part V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
229
42
11 Theoretical Conclusions
229
20
12 Recommendations: LIC Doctrine and Military Organizations as Learning Institutions
249
22
Appendix Measuring Change in Doctrine for Counterinsurgency
271
4
Selected Bibliography
275
12
Index
287