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Tables of Contents for Child Versus Childmaker
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
Preface
xiii
2
Acknowledgments
xv
1 What Is the Person-Affecting Intuition?
1
44
1.1 The Basic Idea
1
2
1.2 What Matters?
3
7
1.3 What Else Matters?
10
1
1.4 Who Matters?
10
2
1.5 People Who Now Exist: "Existing" People
12
1
1.6 People Who Never Exist: "Merely Possible" People
13
1
1.6.1 The Choice Not to Reproduce: A First Test Case
13
1
1.6.2 A "Weakly" Person-Affecting View
14
1
1.7 People Who Will But Do Not Yet Exist: "Future" People
14
8
1.7.1 Choices That Affect Future People's Lives: A Second Test Case
14
1
1.7.2 How Can We Have Obligations Toward People Who Do Not (Yet) Exist?
15
2
1.7.3 How Do We Distinguish Between Future People and Other Possible People?
17
1
1.7.4 If Determinism Is False, Then How Can We Meaningfully Assert Obligations Toward Future People?
17
1
1.7.5 Heyd's Narrow "Person-Affecting" Approach
18
4
1.8 Broome's Inconsistency Argument
22
1
1.9 The Nonidentity Problem
22
7
1.9.1 What Is the Problem?
22
2
1.9.2 A Person-Affecting Reply to the Nonidentity Problem
24
3
1.9.3 Another Version of the Nonidentity Problem: A Third Test Case?
27
2
1.10 Wrongful Life
29
3
1.11 Human Cloning and Other New Reproductive Technologies
32
4
Notes
36
9
2 Is the Person-Affecting Intution Inconsistent?
45
4
2.1 The Intution
45
1
2.2 Broome's Teleological Approach
46
2
2.3 Broome's Formulation of the Person-Affecting Intution
48
1
2.4 Broome's Inconsistency Argument
49
1
2.5 A Problem with Broome's Formulation of the Person-Affecting Intuition
50
2
2.6 A Person-Affecting Sense of "X Is at Least as Good as Y"?
52
2
2.7 Personal Wronging
54
11
2.7.1 Failing to Maximize Is Sometimes, But Not Always, a Sufficient Condition for Personal Wronging
55
1
2.7.2 Failing to Maximize as a Necessary Condition of Personal Wronging
56
1
2.7.3 Wronging the Nonexistent?
56
1
2.7.4 Theory of "Fair Distribution"
57
4
2.7.5 Retribution and Equalization
61
1
2.7.6 Summing up Personalism
62
3
2.8 Is Deprived Deprived in C?
65
1
2.9 Two More Cases
66
5
2.9.1 Complex Reproductive Trade-Offs
66
4
2.9.2 Infinite Populations
70
1
2.10 Objections to Personalism
71
7
2.10.1 Are Suppositions Regarding When Someone Has Been Wronged Question Begging?
71
1
2.10.2 Does Personalism Violate Pareto-Plus?
71
3
2.10.3 Does Personalism Violate the Independence Axiom?
74
4
2.11 Pain and Sin
78
1
Notes
78
9
3 The Nonidentity Problem
87
48
3.1 What Is the Nonidentity Problem?
87
4
3.1.1 Causing Pain and Saving Lives
87
2
3.1.2 Causing Pain and Creating Lives
89
1
3.1.3 The "Precariousness" of Existence
89
1
3.1.4 The Nonidentity Problem
90
1
3.2 Three Nonidentity Cases
91
3
3.2.1 The "Depletion" Case
91
3
3.2.2 The "Slave Child" Case
92
1
3.2.3 The "Pleasure Pill" Case
93
1
3.3 A Person-Affecting Account of the Nonidentity Cases
94
7
3.3.1 An Appeal to "Doing the Best One Can"
94
2
3.3.2 An Equivocation
96
2
3.3.3 More Nonidentity Cases: Parifit's "Two Medical Programs" Case
98
3
3.4 A Counterfactual Interpretation of the Nonidentity Problem
101
2
3.5 A Probabilistic Interpretation of the Nonidentity Problem
103
5
3.6 Nonidentity Victims, Fairness, and Personal Wronging
108
2
3.7 The Case of the Fourteen-Year-Old Girl and the Problem of Future Mistakes
110
1
3.8 A Totalist Solution to the Nonidentity Problem
111
6
3.8.1 "Same Number" and "Different Number" Nonidentity Problems
112
1
3.8.2 A Problem for Totalism: The Choice Not to Reproduce
113
2
3.8.3 A Second Problem for Totalism: The Choice of the "Lesser" Child
115
2
3.9 A Deontic Solution to the Nonidentity Problem
117
2
3.9.1 Restricted Lives and Acting "Wrongly Toward" Future People
117
1
3.9.2 A Problem for the Deontic View: The Choice of the "Lesser" Child
118
1
3.10 Reproductive Trade-Offs: When Producing the Child Is Bad for Others
119
3
3.10.1 A Further Problem for Totalism
119
2
3.10.2 A Person-Affecting Account of Reproductive Trade-Offs
121
1
3.11 The Repugnant Conclusion
122
7
3.11.1 The Case of Distinct Populations
122
1
3.11.2 The Case of Overlapping Populations: The "Repugnant" Version of the Repugnant Conclusion
123
3
3.11.3 The Difference between Personalism and Totalism
126
1
3.11.4 Another Look at Infinite Populations
126
1
3.11.5 Feldman's Concept of Adjusted Utility
127
2
Notes
129
6
4 Wrongful Life
135
44
4.1 The Value of Life
135
2
4.2 Personalism and the Law of Negligence: Common Ground
137
4
4.2.1 The Requirement of Personal Wronging
137
1
4.2.2 The Requirement of a Discernible Effect
138
1
4.2.3 The Rejection of Aggregative Efficiency as Primary Value
138
3
4.3 What Is an Action for Wrongful Life?
141
4
4.3.1 The Theory of Wrongful Life
141
2
4.3.2 Examples of Wrongful Life Claims
143
2
4.4 When Does Life Itself Constitues a Harm?
145
9
4.4.1 Obstacles to Establishing Harm
145
3
4.4.2 The Value of Nonexistence
148
2
4.4.3 The Value of a Flawed Existence
150
1
4.4.4 The Comparison to Nonexistence, Three Examples, and One Problem
151
3
4.5 A Person-Affecting Account of Wrongful Life
154
4
4.6 The Problem of the Baseline and the Model Test of Harm
158
6
4.7 The Problem of Deflected III-Being
164
3
4.8 Logical Objections to Wrongful Life
167
3
4.8.1 A Problem of Consistency?
167
2
4.8.2 A Problem with Reference?
169
1
Notes
170
9
5 Human Cloning
179
38
5.1 The New Reproductive Technologies
179
2
5.2 The Question of Harm to Children
181
5
5.2.1 Who Matters?
181
2
5.2.2 Robertson's Defense of the New Technologies
183
3
5.3 Human Embryonic Cloning
186
4
5.3.1 Defining the Issues: Abortion and the "Dignity" of the Human Embryo
186
2
5.3.2 Robertson's Defense of Embryonic Cloning
188
2
5.4 The Critique
190
8
5.4.1 Who Needs Cloning
190
2
5.4.2 A Person-Affecting Statement of the Critique
192
3
5.4.3 Benefits to Inferetile Couples and the Question of Fairness
195
3
5.5 Are Children Harmed by Cloning?
198
5
5.5.1 The Implications of the Harm Issue
198
1
5.5.2 The Issue of Psychosocial Distress
199
1
5.5.3 The Control Issue; or, What Is Good for the Goose...
200
3
5.6 Human Somatic Cloning
203
3
5.7 Cloning and the Constitution
206
4
5.7.1 The Adult's Right of Procreative Liberty
206
1
5.7.2 The Child's Right of Privacy and Equality
207
2
5.7.3 Policy Implications
209
1
5.8 Commercial Surrogacy and Other New Technologies
210
1
Notes
211
6
Conclusion
217
4
Bibliography
221
6
Index of Names and Subjects
227
4
Index of Principles
231
2
Index of Graphs
233
2
About the Author
235