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Tables of Contents for The Theory of Incentives
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
Foreword
xi
Introduction
1
6
Incentives in Economic Thought
7
21
Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
8
3
Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
11
3
Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem
14
1
Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
15
3
Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
18
1
Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
18
2
Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
20
2
Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
22
1
Incentives in Planned Economies
23
2
Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
25
2
Auctions
27
1
The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
28
54
The Basic Model
32
1
The Complete Information Optimal Contract
33
3
Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
36
3
Information Rents
39
1
The Optimization Program of the Principal
40
1
The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
41
5
The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
46
2
Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
48
1
The Revelation Principle
48
3
A More General Utility Function for the Agent
51
6
Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
57
6
Commitment
63
2
Stochastic Mechanisms*
65
3
Informative Signals to Improve Contracting*
68
4
Contract Theory at Work
72
10
81
1
Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection*
82
63
More than Two Types
86
7
Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
93
8
Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives
101
14
Random Participation Constraint
115
3
Limited Liability
118
3
Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
121
9
Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
130
15
134
11
Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
145
42
The Model
148
5
Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
153
2
The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency
155
3
The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency
158
5
More than Two Levels of Performance
163
4
Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
167
5
Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm
172
2
Contract Theory at Work
174
10
Commitment Under Moral Hazard*
184
3
185
2