Introduction

Bibliography

1. The connection between the following considerations and the preceding ones

2. That the consideration of creatures is useful for instruction of faith

3. That knowledge of the nature of creatures serves to destroy errors concerning God

4. That the philosopher and the theologian consider creatures in different ways

5. Order of procedure

6. That it is proper to God to be the source of the being of other things

7. That active power exists in God

8. That God's power is His substance

9. That God's power is His action

10. How power is attributed to God

11. That something is said of God in relation to creatures

12. That relations predicated of God in reference to creatures do not really exist in Him

13-14. How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God

15. That God is to all things the cause of being

16. That God brought things into being from nothing

17. That creation is neither motion nor change

18. How objections against creation are solved

19. That in creation no succession exists

20. That no body is capable of creative action

21. That the act of creating belongs to God alone

22. That God is omnipotent

23. That God does not act by natural necessity

24. That God acts conformably to His wisdom

25. How the omnipotent God is said to be incapable of certain things

26. That the divine intellect is not confined to limited effects

27. That the divine will is not restricted to certain effects

28-29. How dueness is entailed in the production of things

30. How absolute necessity can exist in created things

31. That it is not necessary for creatures to have always existed

32. Arguments of those who wish to demonstrate the world's eternity from the point of view of God

33. Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from the standpoint of creatures

34. Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making of things

35. Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God

36. Solution of the arguments proposed from the point of view of the things made

37. Solution of the arguments taken from the point of view of the making of things

38. Arguments by which some try to show that the world is not eternal

39. That the distinction of things is not the result of chance

40. That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things

41. That a contrariety of agents does not account for the distinction of things

42. That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the world of secondary agents

43. That the distinction of things is not caused by some secondary agent introducing diverse forms into matter

44. That the distinction of things does not have its source in the diversity of merits or demerits

45. The true first cause of the distinction of things

46. That the perfection of the universe required the existence of some intellectual creatures

47. That intellectual substances are endowed with will

48. That intellectual substances have freedom of choice in acting

49. That the intellectual substance is not a body

50. That intellectual substances are immaterial

51. That the intellectual substance is not a material form

52. That in created intellectual substances, being and what is differ

53. That in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality

54. That the composition of substances and being is not the same as the composition of matter and form

55. That intellectual substances are incorruptible

56. In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body

57. The position of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body

58. That in man there are not three souls, nutritive, sensitive, and intellective

59. That man's possible intellect is not a separate substance

60. That man derives his specific nature, not from the passive, but from the possible, intellect

61. That this theory is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle

62. Against Alexander's opinion concerning the possible intellect

63. That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen maintained

64. That the soul is not a harmony

65. That the soul is not a body

66. Against those who maintain that intellect and sense are the same

67. Against those who hold that the possible intellect is the imagination

68. How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body

69. Solution of the arguments advanced above in order to show that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form

70. That according to the words of Aristotle the intellect must be said to be united to the body as its form

71. That the soul is united to the body without intermediation

72. That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts

73. That there is not one possible intellect in all men

74. Concerning the theory of Avicenna, who said that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect

75. Solution of the seemingly demonstrative arguments for the unity of the possible intellect

76. That the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul

77. That it is not impossible for the possible and agent intellect to exist together in the one substance of the soul

78. That Aristotle held not that the agent intellect is a separate substance, but that it is a part of the soul

79. That the human soul does not perish when the body is corrupted

80-81. Arguments to prove that the corruption of the body entails that of the soul [and their solution]

82. That the souls of brute animals are not immortal

83. That the human soul begins to exist when the body does

84. Solution of the preceding arguments

85. That the soul is not made of God's substance

86. That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen

87. That the human soul is brought into being through the creative action of God

88. Arguments designed to prove that the human soul is formed from the semen

89. Solution of the preceding arguments

90. That an intellectual substance is united only to a human body as its form

91. That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies

92. Concerning the great number of separate substances

93. Of the non-existence of a plurality of separate substances of one species

94. That the separate substance and the soul are not of the same species

95. How in separate substance genus and species are to be taken

96. That separate substances do not receive their knowledge from sensible things

97. That the intellect of a separate substance is always in act of understanding

98. How one separate substance understands another

99. That separate substances know material things

100. That separate substances know singulars

101. Whether separate substances have natural knowledge of all things at the same time

Subject Index

Index of Proper Names