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Tables of Contents for Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
Chapter/Section Title
Page #
Page Count
INTRODUCTION: Four Dimensions of Ethical Theory
3
8
I. Ethical Knowledge, Intuition, and Moral Skepticism
3
1
II. Moral Concepts and the Natural Order
4
1
III. Moral Psychology and Ethical Character
5
1
IV. Reason, Judgment, and Value
6
5
I. MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
11
82
1. Internalism and Externalism in Moral Epistemology
11
21
I. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology
11
2
II. Internalism and Externalism in Ethics
13
4
III. The Range of Internalist and Externalist Moral Theories
17
4
IV. The Moral Appraisal of Actions and Agents
21
11
2. Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics
32
34
I. Traditional Ethical Intuitionism
33
6
II. Intuitions, Intuitionism, and Reflection
39
5
III. Self-Evidence and the Systematization of Intuitions
44
5
IV. Reflection as a Basis for Moral Judgments
49
5
V. Modified Ethical Intuitionism
54
12
3. Skepticism in Theory and Practice: Justification and Truth, Rationality and Goodness
66
27
I. Skepticism about Theoretical Reason
67
1
II. The Practical Analogy to Theoretical Skepticism
68
4
III. Three Major Responses to Normative Skepticism
72
4
IV. The Irreducibility of Truth and Goodness
76
4
V. Internalist Objectivism and Reasons for Action
80
13
II. ETHICAL CONCEPTS AND MORAL REALISM
93
38
4. Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts
93
19
I. Some Major Aims of Moral Epistemology
93
2
II. Cognitivism versus Noncognitivism in Moral Epistemology
95
1
III. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Supervenience in Moral Epistemology
95
2
IV. Empiricism and Reductive Naturalism
97
2
V. Rationalism, Naturalism, and A Priori Supervenience
99
1
VI. Prospects for a Rationalistic Moral Realism
100
12
5. Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts
112
19
I. The Supervenience of the Moral
113
2
II. Explanationist Moral Realism
115
7
III. An Alternative Moral Realism
122
9
III. CHARACTER, RESPONSIBILITY, AND VIRTUE
131
64
6. Self-Deception, Rationalization, and the Ethics of Belief: An Essay in Moral Psychology
131
26
I. Self-Deception and Rationalization
132
5
II. The Self-Deceptive Rationalization of Actions and Attitudes
137
8
III. Self-Deception and Reasons for Acting
145
12
7. Responsible Action and Virtuous Character
157
17
I. The Conceptual Territory
157
2
II. Responsibility for Character
159
5
III. Responsibility and Control
164
2
IV. The Internality of Responsibility
166
8
8. Acting from Virtue
174
21
I. Aristotelian and Kantian Conceptions of Action from Virtue
174
3
II. The Motivation and Range of Action from Virtue
177
3
III. The Cognitive and Motivational Grounding of Action from Virtue
180
5
IV. The Moral Scope of Acting from Virtue
185
10
IV. PRACTICAL REASON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS
195
104
9. Autonomy, Reason, and Desire
195
22
I. Autonomy as Self-Government
195
10
II. An Instrumentalist Conception of Autonomy
205
2
III. An Objectivist Conception of Autonomy
207
2
IV. Autonomy and the Role of Reason
209
8
10. Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action
217
31
I. The Issues: Judgments, Motives, and Reasons
218
6
II. Motivational Reasons and Motivational Internalism
224
2
III. Practical Judgment and the Diversity of Internal Motivation
226
3
IV. Rational Agency and the Evidential Role of Moral Motivation
229
3
V. Normative Reasons and Motivational Internalism
232
2
VI. Reasons Internalism and Moral Motivation
234
3
VII. Reasons Externalism and Moral Motivation
237
11
11. Intrinsic Value and the Dignity of Persons
248
28
I. An Aristotelian Case for Intrinsic Goodness
249
2
II. The Range of Purportedly Intrinsic Goods
251
3
III. Prospects for an Aristotelian Hedonism
254
1
IV. Axiological Experientialism
255
5
V. The Axiological and the Deontic
260
4
VI. The Epistemology of Value
264
4
VII. Problems for Valuational Pluralism
268
8
12. CONCLUSION: The Moral Justification of Actions and the Ethical Character of Persons
276
23
I. Ethics and the Theory of Reasons for Action
276
1
II. Epistemology and Ethical Theory
277
2
III. The Justification of Moral Judgments: A Kantian Intuitionism
279
7
IV. The Descriptive and Explanatory Powers of Moral Concepts
286
2
V. Ethics in Action, Morality in Character
288
2
VI. Virtue in Character and Moral Worth in Action
290
1
VII. Reason and Motivation
291
3
VIII. The Place of Value in the Foundations of Ethics
294
5
Index
299