Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory is the first publication of Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes from the first part of his well-known course in microeconomic theory, which he has taught for fifteen years to first-year graduate students at Tel Aviv, Princeton, and New York universities. The book will be an invaluable supplement to primary textbooks in microeconomic theory. Conveying the style and method of Rubinstein's lectures, it will benefit teachers and research economists as well as students. The book focuses on and provides a critical assessment of models of rational economic agents, and it contains a large number of original problems. Rubinstein, one of the world's most-respected economics theorists, has made substantial contributions to several fields in economics, particularly game theory. His work is characterized by an unusual combination of deep originality and surprising simplicity. He is probably best known for his contributions to the bargaining problem and, more recently, to bounded rationality.

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Product Description: The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950's by Herbert Simon. In this book the author defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modelling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications...read more (view table of contents, read Amazon.com's description)

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Product Description: During the 1980s, economic theory has been revolutionised by game theory. The game theory approach is now very widely used throughout the profession and has become a major tool for the construction of new economic models. It is the basic tool in the construction of a modern theory of industrial organisation and it has led to important developments in finance, labour economics and international trade...read more

Product Description: The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly...read more