A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in orders to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

Published as a tribute to the memory of Elisha Pazner, this book contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms, written and edited by the major contributors to the field. Amongst the topics included are bargaining theory and the economics of competitive bidding. The surveys are preceded by 'A Perspective', by Leo Hurwicz which contains a systematic account of the development of the literature on mechanism design, and this provides a context for both the surveys and the six published papers authored or co-authored by Elisha Pazner that complete the book and demonstrate Pazner's interest in and contribution to the study of economic mechanisms. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the effectiveness of markets.