search for books and compare prices
cover image
The Core of Economies With Asymetric Information
Price
Store
Arrives
Preparing
Shipping
The price is the lowest for any condition, which may be new or used; other conditions may also be available. Rental copies must be returned at the end of the designated period, and may involve a deposit.
Jump down to see edition details for: Paperback
Bibliographic Detail
Publisher Springer Verlag
Publication date September 1, 1999
Pages 141
Binding Paperback
Book category Adult Non-Fiction
ISBN-13 9783540660286
ISBN-10 3540660283
Dimensions 0.25 by 9.25 by 9.25 in.
Weight 0.55 lbs.
Published in Europe
Original list price $89.99
Summaries and Reviews
Amazon.com description: Product Description: and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop­ 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana­ 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar­ ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in­ formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con­ tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob­ lem.

Editions
Paperback
Book cover for 9783540660286
 
The price comparison is for this edition
from Springer Verlag (September 1, 1999)
9783540660286 | details & prices | 141 pages | 9.25 × 9.25 × 0.25 in. | 0.55 lbs | List price $89.99
About: and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory.

Pricing is shown for items sent to or within the U.S., excluding shipping and tax. Please consult the store to determine exact fees. No warranties are made express or implied about the accuracy, timeliness, merit, or value of the information provided. Information subject to change without notice. isbn.nu is not a bookseller, just an information source.