Amazon.com description: Product Description: VERY GOOD FIRST EDITION 1967 softcover, free tracking number, clean text, solid binding, NO remainders NOT ex-library, smoke free; slight gentle shelfwear / storage-wear; WE SHIP FAST. Carefully packed and quickly sent. 201607543as In the Preface to Realism. A critique of Brentano and Meinong (Bergmann, 1967), Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) stated that that was «the sort of book a man writes only once in his life» (p. VII). In fact, Realism is a formidable work, which combines different purposes. The first half of the book mainly consists in a presentation of Bergmann's mature views, as they have developed through the years, from the strictly positivistic beginnings, in the footsteps of Carnap and the Vienna Circle, to the rich ontology of the 60s. Bergmann's aim is that of firmly establishing a realistic view, in two different senses of the word 'realism': realism1, the view according to which universals exist (in opposition to nominalism); and realism2, the view according to which - roughly speaking - the "world" is independent of minds (in opposition to idealism). It is Bergmann's considered view that a failure to secure a solidly realistic1 ontology almost inevitably leads to some form of idealism (Bonino, 2009). The book can also be read as a sustained criticism of three main stumbling blocks on the way to realism2: nominalism, reism, and representationalism. Nominalism is of course the view according to which there are no universals. Reism can be preliminary characterized as the view according to which all entitites are things (in a sense of 'thing' that will be specified later). Representationalism is the view that there are intermediaries of some sort between mental entities (subjects, minds, or whatever) and their intentions; such intermediaries (typical examples of which are the ideas of the empiricist tradition) inhabit whatPlease choose Priority / Expedited shipping for faster delivery. (No shipping to Mexico, Brazil or Italy.)